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CHINA’S COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW:
WHAT HAS BEEN LEARNED AND THE GAPS
REMAINING
Roda Mushkat†
Abstract: Chinese willingness and ability to play by the rules in the global arena
is a critical issue that has long loomed large on the academic and policy agendas. A
substantial body of knowledge has been built in the past two decades, shedding
considerable light on key dimensions of the question. However, there is an apparent need
to fine-tune the approach pursued thus far by seeking greater methodological robustness
and better theoretical elucidation. Data collection procedures must be anchored more
firmly in principles of scientific inquiry, providing a solid empirical foundation for
reliable and valid generalizations, and single-cause explanations need to be jettisoned in
favor of multi-pronged approaches.

I.

INTRODUCTION

China’s historical journey in the contemporary era has been
remarkably tumultuous. In the political domain, the embryonic republican
institutions, which had displaced crumbling imperial structures, had been
violently supplanted by an authoritarian order of the hard variety, which in
turn has been deliberately transformed into a soft one. In the economic
realm, a highly decentralized and largely agrarian system, based on smallscale farming and commerce organized along essentially feudal lines, had
been forcefully cast off in favor of a rigid top-down communist edifice
designed to bring about rapid industrialization, which later has been mostly
dismantled following an ideological shift toward gradual liberalization. In
the international sphere, selective engagement, albeit colored by nationalist
sentiment, had given way to withdrawal, which subsequently has
metamorphosed into renewed engagement, even though restrained at times.1
This is a generalization and, consequently, an oversimplification. In
fact, the historical phases have not been as uniform as implied above. Each
has been characterized by zigzag, rather than linear, movement. The
superficial impression may be that the Maoist period had featured a
relentless pursuit of power by a single-minded revolutionary elite,
unwavering collectivization, and ardent isolationism. However, this is not
†
Professor and Director of the Center for International and Public Law, Brunel Law School, Brunel
University; Honorary Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong; and Visiting Professor,
Kadoorie Institute, University of Hong Kong. I wish to thank Miron Mushkat for helping me navigate
through social science territory and the Kadoorie Institute for its research support, but the author is solely
responsible for the views expressed herein.
1
See generally KENNETH G. LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH
REFORM (2d ed., W.W. Norton 2004); BARRY NAUGHTON, THE CHINESE ECONOMY: TRANSITIONS AND
GROWTH (The MIT Press 2007).
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an accurate portrayal of the strategic thrust at the time. Both policy direction
and pace had varied considerably during that stage of the post-1949 regime
adaptation. This complicates the picture and exacerbates, rather than
diminishes, the sense of perpetual and unpredictable motion.2
Students of international relations have naturally focused on the
descriptive, explanatory, and prescriptive facets of external cooperation and
estrangement. They have been driven by a mixture of intellectual curiosity
and practical considerations. The former has been inspired by growing
interdependence, as distinct from mere interconnectedness, among States,
and its increasing complexity,3 coupled with the traditional Chinese
propensity to resist the pull of the center and chart an autonomous course.4
These two contradictory trends have been perceived as a source of actual
and potential friction, and their problematic coexistence has stimulated
academic interest and inquiry.5
China is thought to have been generally uncomfortable with the
concept of interdependence because it has been at variance with the core
values of independence, sovereignty, and self-reliance. The first (duli, or
more fully, duli zizhu) is equated with preserving autonomy and maintaining
initiative. The second (zhuquan) is associated with the exercise of exclusive
power. The third (zili gengsheng) places strong emphasis on regeneration
through one’s own efforts, and possesses deep historical roots, as well as
Buddhist underpinnings, which may extend as far as the Tang Dynasty.6
The practical concerns have stemmed from the resources—notably,
economic base, military arsenal, and population—at the disposal of the
country and the competence it has displayed in recent years in converting
them into capabilities.7 Since it has not consistently adopted a cooperative
posture, and has at times acted in a defiant fashion, considerable research
has been channeled into determining how to prevent the Chinese threat from
materializing, with some analysts advocating positive inducements
(engagement) and others favoring negative therapy (containment).8
These concerns have abated, but have not vanished altogether, as
pragmatism has intensified and ideological fervor has receded in China. The
evolution of its foreign policy behavior during the contemporary era has
2

See LIEBERTHAL, supra note 1, at 85-122; NAUGHTON, supra note 1, at 55-84.
See ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD POLITICS IN
TRANSITION (Little, Brown and Company 1977).
4
See Michael Yahuda, How Much Has China Learned about Interdependence, in CHINA RISING:
NATIONALISM AND INTERDEPENDENCE 7-13 (David S.G. Goodman & Gerald Segal eds., Routledge 1997).
5
See id. at 7-13.
6
See id. at 8.
7
See id. at 6-7.
8
See id. at 21-23.
3
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come over time to be more confidently seen as featuring gradual, albeit
uneven, progression from autarky, self-reliance, and dependence (an
asymmetrical configuration, such as that prevailing in 1949-1958, the leanto-one-side period characterized by a heavy reliance on the Soviet Union)
toward a recognition, although not unambiguous, of the necessity and merits
of (symmetrical) interdependence.9 As this pattern has crystallized, the
sense of unease has subsided and the attractions of engagement have begun
to outweigh those of containment.10
Nothing symbolizes more poignantly the transition from a profoundly
inward-looking orientation to an essentially outward-looking one than the
commitment, even if mostly rhetorical at this juncture, to build a
“harmonious world with an open mind.”11 It was enunciated by Chinese
President Hu Jintao at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (“APEC”)
CEO Summit on November 17, 2005, and signaled, at the highest strategic
level, a willingness to embrace multilateralism, practice it in a mutuallybeneficial manner, accept cultural diversity openly and without prejudice,
and make a tangible contribution to the process of enhancing the
effectiveness of global governance mechanisms.12
However, this is not a clear-cut picture. Attention is thus commonly
drawn to the word, or deed disjuncture, or the gap “between the ideals,
principles, and orientations expressed in policy pronouncements and the
actual conduct of foreign policy.”13 The implication is that China should be
judged by the strategies that it pursues rather than those that it espouses.14
The motives for the newfound enthusiasm for multilateralism have also been
subject to critical scrutiny. It has been argued that it may reflect utilitarian
considerations rather than a fundamental cognitive adjustment culminating
in the formation of benign worldview, or that both influences may be at
work.15
9
Samuel S. Kim, New Directions & Old Puzzles in Chinese Foreign Policy, in CHINA AND THE
WORLD: NEW DIRECTIONS IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY 11-15 (Samuel S. Kim ed., Westview Press 2d ed.
1989).
10
See Samuel S. Kim, Chinese Foreign Policy in Theory and Practice, in CHINA AND THE WORLD:
CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY FACES THE NEW MILLENNIUM 3-9 (Samuel S. Kim ed., Westview Press 4th ed.
1998).
11
“HARMONIOUS WORLD” AND CHINA’S NEW FOREIGN POLICY 1 (Sujian Guo & Jean-Marc F.
Blanchard eds., Lexington Books 2008).
12
See id at 1-4.
13
Kim, supra note 9, at 9.
14
See id.
15
See generally CHINA’S NEW DIPLOMACY: TACTICAL OR FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE (Pauline Kerr,
Stuart Harris & Qin Yaqing eds., Palgrave Macmillan 2008); CHINA TURNS TO MULTILATERALISM:
FOREIGN POLICY AND REGIONAL SECURITY (Guogang Wu & Helen Lansdowne eds., Routledge 2008).
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Similar themes pervade the literature on Chinese attitudes toward
international law.16 The focus there is primarily, but not exclusively, on
16
See generally Ann Kent, China’s Changing Attitude to the Norms of International Law and its
Global Impact, in CHINA’S NEW DIPLOMACY: TACTICAL OR FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE, supra note 15, at 5576; Jeremy Paltiel, Peaceful Rise? Soft Power? Human Rights in China’s New Multilateralism, in CHINA
TURNS TO MULTILATERALISM: FOREIGN POLICY AND REGIONAL SECURITY, supra note 15, at 198-221;
BUENO DE MESQUITA, DAVID NEWMAN & ALVIN RABUSHKA, FORECASTING POLITICAL EVENTS: THE
FUTURE OF HONG KONG (Yale Univ. Press 1985); Ann Kent, China and the International Human Rights
Regime: A Case Study of Multilateral Monitoring, 1989-1994, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 1-47 (1995) [hereinafter
Kent, China and the International Human Rights Regime]; BUENO DE MESQUITA, DAVID NEWMAN &
ALVIN RABUSHKA, RED FLAG OVER HONG KONG (Chatham House Publishers 1996); Alastair I. Johnston,
Learning versus Adaptation: Explaining Change in Chinese Arms Conflict Policy in the 1980s and 1990s,
35 CHINA J. 27-61 (1996) [hereinafter Johnston, Learning versus Adaptation]; Xinxia Wang, The
Implementation of CITES in China, in IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 204-10, (James Cameron, Jacob Weksman & Peter Roderik eds., Earthscan Publications 1996);
Alastair I. Johnston, China and International Environmental Institutions: A Decision Rule Analysis, in
ENERGIZING CHINA: RECONCILING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 555-99
(Michael B. McElroy, Chris P. Nielson & Peter Lydon eds., Harvard Univ. Press 1998) [hereinafter
Johnston, China and International Environmental Institutions]; Michel Oksenberg & Elizabeth Economy,
China: Implementation under Economic and Market Reform, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS 353-94 (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K.
Jacobson eds., The MIT Press 1998); ANN KENT, CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE
LIMITS OF COMPLIANCE (Univ. of Pennsylvania Press 1999) [hereinafter KENT, CHINA, THE UNITED
NATIONS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS]; Michael D. Swaine & Alastair I. Johnson, China and Arms Control
Institutions, in CHINA JOINS THE WORLD: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 90-135 (Elizabeth Economy & Michel
Oksenberg eds., Council on Foreign Relations Press 1999); Andrew J. Nathan, China and the International
Human Rights Regime, in CHINA JOINS THE WORLD: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 136-60 (Elizabeth
Economy & Michel Oksenberg eds., Council on Foreign Relations Press 1999); Margaret M. Pearson,
China’s Integration into the International Trade and Investment Regime, in CHINA JOINS THE WORLD :
PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 161-205 (Elizabeth Economy & Michel Oksenberg eds., Council on Foreign
Relations Press 1999); Kunmin Zhang & Can Wang, China’s Sustainable Development Strategy, in
IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN GERMANY AND CHINA 1-19 (Zhenghua Tao &
Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., Kluwer Law International 2001); Ann Kent, China’s International Socialization:
The Role of International Organizations, 8 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 343 (2002) [hereinafter Kent, China’s
International Socialization]; Paul Thiers, Challenges for WTO Implementation: Lessons from China’s Deep
Integration into an International Trade Regime, 11 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 413 (2002); Gerald Chan, China’s
Compliance in Global Environmental Affairs, 45 ASIA PAC. VIEWPOINT 69 (2004); Gerald Chan, China and
the WTO: The Theory and Practice of Compliance, 4 INT’L REL. ASIA-PAC. 47 (2004); Miron Mushkat &
Roda Mushkat, The Political Economy of International Legal Compliance: Pre-1997 Predictions and Post1997 Realities in Hong Kong, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y. 229 (2004) [hereinafter Mushkat &
Mushkat, The Political Economy of International Legal Compliance]; Gerald Chan, Responsibility and
Compliance in China’s WTO Policy: Implications for Sino-US Relations, in RETURN OF THE DRAGON: USCHINA RELATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 85-109 (Danny Pauu & Herbert Yee eds., Peter Lang 2005);
Gerald Chan, Globalisation Rules and China’s Compliance, 41 CHINA REP. 59 (2005); Miron Mushkat &
Roda Mushkat, International Law and Game Theory: A Marriage of Convenience or Strange Bedfellows?,
2 N. Z. Y.B. INT’L L. 101 (2005) [hereinafter Mushkat & Mushkat, International Law and Game Theory];
Allen Carlson, More Than Just Saying No: China’s Evolving Approach to Sovereignty and Intervention
Since Tiananmen, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE STUDY OF CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY 217-41 (Alastair Iain
Johnston & Robert S. Ross eds., Stanford Univ. Press 2006); Margaret M. Pearson, China in Geneva:
Lessons from China’s Early Years in the World Trade Organization, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE STUDY OF
CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY 242-75 (Alastair Iain Johnston & Robert S. Ross eds., Stanford Univ. Press
2006); GERALD CHAN, CHINA’S COMPLIANCE IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS: TRADE, ARMS CONTROL,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, HUMAN RIGHTS (World Scientific 2006) [hereinafter CHAN, CHINA’S
COMPLIANCE IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS]; Ann Kent, Compliance v Cooperation: China and International Law,
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compliance. A trend featuring greater adherence to international rules is
discerned.17 This is an inevitable product of liberalization at home and
integration into the global community. Yet, again, the pattern that emerges
is not indicative of linear movement from autarky to interdependence.18 The
word versus deed dichotomy frequently surfaces and the issue of motives
continues to loom large on the unfolding research agenda.19
The writings on China’s international legal compliance are less
voluminous than those on its international relations. They are also not as
interconnected and systematic. There is no strong sense of collective
endeavor leading to the gradual accumulation of knowledge. The theoretical
and methodological underpinnings cannot be portrayed as robust. The
corollary is that it may be desirable to pause and assess what has been
achieved to date, particularly in descriptive and explanatory terms (policy
prescription may be regarded as a separate issue), and where analytical
resources should be directed for further progress to be realized. This is the
purpose of the present paper.
II.

TAKING STOCK OF SCHOLARLY DEVELOPMENTS

A.

Conceptual Architecture

Researchers in the field of international law commonly proceed to
examine State behavior in a normative context without addressing
preliminary analytical issues routinely attended to by students of other social
phenomena. This may reflect the fact that the predominantly inductive
nature of legal inquiry fosters a shared understanding of the ideas explored
13 AUSTL. INT’L L. J. 19 (2006) [hereinafter Kent, Compliance v Cooperation]; Gørild Heggelund, China’s
Climate Change Policy: Domestic and International Developments, 31(2) ASIAN PERSP. 155 (2007); Gørild
Heggelund & Ellen Bruzelius Backer, China and the UN Environmental Policy: Institutional Growth,
Learning, and Implementation, 7 INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS: POL., L., & ECON. 415 (2007); ANN KENT,
BEYOND COMPLIANCE: CHINA, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND GLOBAL SECURITY (Stanford Univ.
Press 2007) [hereinafter KENT, BEYOND COMPLIANCE]; Miron Mushkat & Roda Mushkat, The Political
Economy of Sovereignty Revisited: A Re-examination of the Public Choice Model in Light of China’s
Accession to the World Trade Organization, 7 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 115 (2007) [hereinafter
Mushkat & Mushkat, The Political Economy of Sovereignty Revisited]; Pitman B. Potter, China and the
International Legal System: Challenges of Participation, 191 CHINA Q. 699 (2007); Hongyuan Yu,
International Institutions and Transformation of China’s Decision Making on Climate Change, 1 CHINESE
J INT’L POL. 497 (2007); Gerald Chan, Pak K. Lee & Lai-Ha Chan, China’s Environmental Governance:
The Domestic-International Nexus, 29 THIRD WORLD Q. 291 (2008) [hereinafter Chan, Lee & Chan,
China’s Environmental Governance]; Roda Mushkat, Dissecting International Compliance: An Unfinished
Odyssey, 38 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 161 (2009) [hereinafter Mushkat, Dissecting International
Compliance].
17
See, e.g., CHAN, CHINA’S COMPLIANCE IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS, supra note 16.
18
See, e.g., Yahuda, supra note 4, at 6-26.
19
See, e.g., Kim, supra note 9, at 9.
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and patterns observed. Certain established formalities strictly adhered to by
practitioners of deductive logic may thus be dispensed with and the problem
at hand may be investigated in an unencumbered fashion. However, in an
intellectually fluid domain such as the study of international legal
compliance,20 it may be desirable to place a broad evaluation, such as
undertaken here, within a systematic framework.
Rule conformity in the international arena, or lack thereof, is a
variable—whether binary (yes versus no), ordered categorical (more or less,
without specifying the degree), or continuous. Variables, in turn, are
embedded in concepts. A careful dissection of the former must generally be
preceded by a methodical scrutiny of the latter. This is a time-honored
proposition reaffirmed decades ago by two social scientists who have
stipulated that, prior to seeking to determine the presence or absence of some
attribute (e.g., compliance), “or before we can rank objects or measure them
in terms of some variable, we must form the concept of that variable.”21 The
implication is that a systematic framework for grappling with adherence to
international law needs to rest on a solid conceptual foundation.
The linkage with variables may generate overly narrow connotations.
In fact, concepts stretch far afield analytically in that they may be viewed as
theories about ontology, or to state it more explicitly, as “theories about the
fundamental constitutive elements of a phenomenon.”22 By extension, they
focus on “the core characteristics of a phenomenon and their
interrelationships.”23 Moreover, they possess explanatory power by virtue of
identifying ontological features that “play a key role in
casual . . . mechanisms.”24 Finally, they have a realist dimension because
their use “involves an empirical analysis of the phenomenon.”25 It follows
that concept is a “somewhat more abstract term than . . . variable, and it
implies a richness, depth, and complexity that undermines any sense of
oversimplification.”26
Concept formation is a multilevel and multidimensional process. The
first, and analytically most basic, level entails broad yet compact
specification of the concept (e.g., parliamentary democracy), as typically
20

See generally Mushkat, Dissecting International Compliance, supra note 16.
Paul F. Lazarsfeld & Allen H. Barton, Qualitative Measurement in the Social Sciences:
Classification, Typologies, and Indices, in THE POLICY SCIENCES: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SCOPE AND
METHOD 155-92, 155 (Daniel Lerner & Harold D. Lasswell eds., Stanford Univ. Press 1951).
22
GARY GOERTZ, SOCIAL SCIENCE CONCEPTS: A USER’S GUIDE 5 (Princeton Univ. Press 2006).
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
DAVID W. BRITT, A CONCEPTUAL INTRODUCTION TO MODELING: QUALITATIVE AND
QUANTITATIVE PERSPECTIVES 21 (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates 1997).
21
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seen in theoretical propositions.27 At the secondary level, the constitutive
dimensions of the concept are identified (e.g., for democracy, these may be
universal franchise, competitive elections, civil rights, and so forth).28 The
third level consists of conversion into empirical indicators, or data-centered
operationalization of the concept.29
The progression from one level to another is an open-ended and
iterative, rather than top-down and linear, undertaking. Notably, the
secondary-level constitutive dimensions are often combined, via addition or
multiplication, to arrive at the basic- or first-level concept, although
disaggregation involving movement in the opposite direction is not
uncommon.30 By the same token, the quest for empirical indicators is
seldom implemented in one step but generally entails several rounds of
meaningful adjustment characterized by intensive circular cross-level
movement.31
Traditionally, the aggregation of secondary-level constitutive
dimensions into a coherent basic- or first-level concept has been
underpinned by the Aristotelian notion of necessary and sufficient
conditions. In classical philosophical thought, concept definition requires
the specification of the necessary and sufficient conditions for a
phenomenon to fit into a designated category.32 Each of these standards is a
secondary dimension: “the structural glue that binds the secondary-level
dimensions together to form the basic level is the mathematics of necessary
and sufficient conditions.”33
Developments in cognitive psychology, logic, and philosophy have
paved the way for another approach to concept construction, one focused on
family resemblance, dispensing altogether with the necessary and sufficient
conditions requirement.34 According to this criterion, “[a]ll one needs is
enough resemblance on secondary-level dimensions to be part of the
family.”35 The proposition reflects the realization that concepts may have no
essential attributes but nevertheless exhibit likeness that justifies grouping
under one rubric.36 Thus, “[w]hether a certain animal is considered a ‘bird’
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

See GOERTZ, supra note 22, at 6.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 7-9.
See BRITT, supra note 26, at 14-15.
See GOERTZ, supra note 22, at 7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 29.
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depends on how similar it is to prototypical birds like robins, sparrows,
etc.”37
The difference between the two yardsticks may be highlighted by
juxtaposing a definition of a militarized interstate dispute with that of an
international crisis. The latter has been portrayed as a situation with three
necessary and sufficient conditions deriving from a change in a State’s
external or internal environment. All three are perceptions held by the
highest level decision-makers of the actors concerned: 1) a threat to basic
values, along with 2) the awareness of finite time for response to the external
value threat, and 3) a high probability of involvement in military hostilities.38
By contrast, the term militarized interstate dispute refers to “united
historical cases of conflict in which the threat, display, or use of military
force short of war by one member State is explicitly directed towards the
government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of
another State.” 39 The principal dimension of this concept is the presence of
a threat or resort to force short of war. Any potential militarized dispute is
explored by assessing all participants. If any exhibits a level of hostility
exceeding the threshold of a “serious threat to use military force,”40 then that
State and its target join the population of dispute actors.
The threat or recourse to force is not a necessary condition for
qualifying as such. A target in a dispute may be classified as a party to the
conflict even if it refrains from reciprocating threats or forcefully retaliating.
The structural principle employed here is the maximum level of hostility
displayed by any of the participants. Once any participant crosses the threat
threshold, all targets of such action are included as dispute actors even if
they do not surpass the threshold themselves. The concept of a militarized
interstate dispute is thus an effective example of the family resemblance
invocation of the maximum criterion for dyadic and multilateral
relationships.
This illustrates that concepts are not carved in stone, or that they may
be loosened up and tightened up, as circumstances warrant. In technical
parlance, this is known as concept extension and intension.41 Loosening up
is accompanied by a decrease in intension and an increase in extension (i.e.,
the scope of the concept widens and it becomes more elastic). Tightening up
37

Id.
See MICHAEL BRECHER, JONATHAN WILKENFELD & SHEILA MOSER, CRISES IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY: VOLUME I HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CRISES 3 (Pergamon Press 1988).
39
David M. Jones, Stuart A. Bremer & J. David Singer, Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992:
Rationale, Coding Rules, and Empirical Patterns, 15(2) CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. 163, 168 (1996).
40
Id. at 166.
41
See GOERTZ, supra note 22, at 10.
38
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has the opposite impact.42 In the example above, the concept of militarized
interstate dispute has greater extension, or lesser intension, than that of a
crisis for two reasons that may be readily discerned.
First, to be categorized as a militarized dispute actor, a participant
does not have to embark on any military initiative at all, whereas to qualify
as a crisis actor three necessary conditions that are jointly sufficient need to
be met. Second, the militarized dispute procedure takes into account merely
the one dimension of level of hostility in establishing whether a crucial event
(a militarized interstate dispute) has occurred, while the screening device
relied upon in drawing a similar conclusion regarding another crucial event
(a crisis) again stringently requires the satisfaction of three necessary and
jointly sufficient conditions. This, in turn, raises the issue of where to draw
the line between positive and negative cases (e.g., compliance versus noncompliance). On the one hand, if a concept is loosened up excessively,
virtually any kind of behavior may be seen as consistent with rule
conformity. On the other hand, if it is tightened up markedly, scarcely any
type of conduct may be regarded as fulfilling the lofty standards of strict
adherence to the law.43 There is no magic formula for striking a balance
between the two objectives, but a disciplined approach, coupled with a high
degree of transparency, is called for.44
The notion of family resemblance suggests that concept formation
involves grouping together phenomena that have properties in common
(convergence) and separating ones that have different properties in common
(divergence or differentiation).45 A parallel process entails mapping
phenomena with common properties onto dimensions ranging from low to
high, in order to facilitate discriminations based on intensity, maturity,
potency, and so forth.46 Convergent or divergent and discriminant strategies
feature in qualitative (i.e., with similar characteristics to those pursued in the
legal field) as well as quantitative research.47
As pointed out earlier, concepts need to be matched with empirical
indicators, necessitating the construction of concept-indicator models.48 As
they do not dwell in a theoretical vacuum, the relationships between
concepts must also be specified.49 The relevant dimensions in this respect
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

See id.
See id. at 19-22.
See id. at 177-210.
See BRITT, supra note 26, at 22.
See id.
See id. at 22-24.
See id. at 23.
See id. at 50-74.
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may include direction (one or both ways), linearity (or lack thereof), polarity
(whether the connected concepts change in the same or opposite direction),
strength (intensity of the linkage), symmetry (whether the polarities
observed are contingent on the direction of the driving concept), and
temporality (i.e., the relative time order of related concepts).50 Connecting
concepts is at the heart of the theory-building or model-construction
process.51
B.

Reviewing Insights Generated To Date

Chinese compliance with international law has primarily been
explored at the basic or first level, but without overlooking essential
methodological issues. The term at which the scholarly effort has been
directed—typically left unexplained in the emerging literature on the
subject, presumably because its meaning was implicitly assumed to be
widely shared—is formally defined in recent writings, albeit not necessarily
in a uniform fashion. For example, in a paper selectively examining China’s
adherence to the provisions of the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the
Question of Hong Kong, compliance is broadly equated with “a state of
conformity or identity between an actor’s behavior and a specified rule.”52
It is also noted that some authors incorporate motives into their
extended definitions by highlighting a distinction between compliance
secured by negative-style tactics (e.g., fear of punishment) and more positive
or softer attitudinal methods (e.g., inculcation of norms via explicit or tacit
educational socialization).53 This observation is qualified by remarking that
the practice is not common and that the issue of causality is generally dealt
with separately.54 Another distinction underscored in the same paper is that
between compliance and implementation, which is viewed as “the process of
converting commitments into action and legal system effectiveness.”55 The
reason lies in the fact that “rule effectiveness may persist in the face of low
compliance and high compliance may coincide with ineffective standards.”56
The differentiation between negative and positive tactics, and the act
of conformity and implementation, constitutes a simple form of a divergent
50

See id.
See BRITT, supra note 26, at 50-131; CHARLES A. LAVE & JAMES G. MARCH, INTRODUCTION TO
MODELS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (Ronald Taylor & Lois Lombardo eds., Univ. Press of America 1993)
(1975).
52
Mushkat, Dissecting International Compliance, supra note 16, at 162.
53
Id. at 163.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
51

JANUARY 2011

CHINA’S COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW

51

research strategy. Other useful distinctions have been put forth by students
of Chinese international legal compliance. One is that between a State’s
globally responsible conduct and its adherence to international rules.57
There is a clear linkage between the two notions which needs to be brought
into focus through appropriate conceptual mapping. Nevertheless, each term
possesses different connotations and centers on a distinct phenomenon.
An additional difference illuminatingly expounded in the current
literature is that between compliance and cooperation. The former merits
close attention, but it “is not the whole story. To gain a complete
understanding of the dynamics of [S]tate integration into the international
system, we must go [further].”58 “Consequently, [i]n this book, . . . ‘beyond
compliance’ is used as an analytical concept, designating the need to move
beyond sole consideration of formal compliance (and non-compliance) in
evaluating the integration of a [S]tate into the international system, to the
broader political questions of cooperation (and non-cooperation).”59
Globally responsible States do not invariably respect international law
and, if States do, this is not necessarily an affirmation of their propensity to
consistently act in a manner conducive to global well-being.60 By the same
token, “cooperation may not always lead to compliance with rules, and
compliance can occur without cooperation, for instance, as a consequence of
the imposition of coercive sanctions.”61 However, such divergences should
not be overstated. Thus, “if a [S]tate’s compliance with an international
norm or rule is associated with long-term cooperation, it is more likely to be
a function of ‘deep’ compliance whereas, without cooperation, compliance
may be merely instrumental.”62
The attempts to place Chinese adherence to international law in a
wider context apparently reflect residual concerns about the motives and
quality of commitments of a former “rogue” State which is rapidly evolving
into a global power, having already achieved a prominent regional status.
The trend is also indicative of the growing maturity of scholarship in this
field. Without loosening up the notion of compliance, researchers engage in
de facto conceptual mapping, highlighting fundamental disjunctions and
connections, and generating theoretical enlightenment in the process.
57
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As suggested earlier, these attempts are largely confined to the basic
or first level of the analytical structure outlined in the present paper. Yet,
there are exceptions to the norm. A notable example is the work of a group
of researchers who boldly endeavored to predict, before the resumption of
sovereignty over Hong Kong by China in 1997, the country’s likely
compliance with the terms of the Sino-British Joint Declaration. They
concluded erroneously that this international legal instrument would be
blatantly disregarded by Chinese policy makers, but a salient feature of their
survey was a detailed specification of how exactly the flaunting of the rules
might possibly manifest itself at the secondary level.63
This particular illustration may also serve the purpose of underscoring
the increasing diversity of the writings on China’s international legal
compliance. Initially, for obvious reasons, there was a predominance of
negative cases, in which non-observance of the law was given prominence.64
Later, the focus has shifted to positive cases.65 Interestingly, however, the
grey zone lying between the two ends of the continuum has remained in the
theoretical spotlight. For instance, the ambiguities characterizing Chinese
attitudes toward the World Trade Organization have recently been
dissected.66
Determining conceptual linkages, within an explanatory framework,
has been the ultimate aim of case analysis—whether negative, positive, or
neutral in its orientation. Various theoretical propositions have been
formulated regarding the drivers (causes) of China’s posture vis-à-vis
international law (effect). At the risk of some oversimplification, it can be
said that scholars drawn to the negative cases have been inclined to embrace
Austinian-realist and Hobbesian-utilitarian perspectives, and that those
gravitating toward the positive cases have tended to opt for Kantian-liberal
and Benthamian-constructivist or cognitivist interpretative schemes.67
The weight of negative cases has been so substantial and the
intellectual pull of the realist and (neoclassical) utilitarian traditions so
63
See DE MESQUITA, NEWMAN & RABUSHKA, FORECASTING POLITICAL EVENTS: THE FUTURE OF
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BEYOND COMPLIANCE, supra note 16; CHAN, CHINA’S COMPLIANCE IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS, supra note 16.
66
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See generally Mushkat, Dissecting International Compliance, supra note 16; Miron Mushkat &
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strong that these approaches have inevitably had a far more pronounced
impact on model-building or theory-development geared toward
methodically illuminating Chinese international legal compliance than any
other analytical paradigms. Researchers who subscribe to such views
portray China as a unitary actor bent on enhancing its national interest,
mostly expressed in material (economic and military) terms, and
maneuvering accordingly in all circumstances and on all fronts, including
with respect to international law.
The assertion that, everywhere and at any juncture, Chinese external
strategies are underpinned by the maxi or mini principle resonates with
scholars who belong to this school of thought. That crisply-enunciated
principle states that China’s conduct of foreign affairs is inspired by a desire
to maximize its rights and interests and to minimize its responsibilities and
normative costs. The pursuit of this compact formula triggers an
unscrupulous “quest to make the best of all possible worlds.”68 Symptoms
of such a stance may be seen in neo-mercantilist international economic
practices69 and a tendency to free ride on the back of obligations assumed by
others to constrain the production and/or deployment of particular arms
while avoiding as much as possible similar undertakings.70 In the military
domain, the following strategic tenets are apparently adhered to:
1) Maximize material capabilities above all. State security rests
in large measure on possessing the unilateral ability to use
military force against any potential adversary. The constraints
on this ability should therefore be as low as technologically and
economically feasible.
2) Avoid high cost commitments. This follows from the first
decision rule. High costs are defined as any commitment which
prevents or closes off future options to improve relative military
capabilities.
3) If avoidance incurs image costs, then try to avoid high cost
commitments but join low cost, high profile activities. More
specifically, pursue high profile unilateral commitments and
pledges, and eschew high cost multilateral commitments. This
decision rule maximizes image payoffs, and minimizes the
68
See Samuel S. Kim, China In and Out of the Changing World, 2 CTR. FOR INT’L STUD., WORLD
ORD. STUD. PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER, 1991, at 25-27.
69
See ROBERT KLEINBERG, CHINA’S “OPENING” TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD: THE EXPERIMENT WITH
FOREIGN CAPITALISM 254-68 (Westview Press 1990).
70
See generally Alastair I. Johnston, Learning versus Adaptation, supra note 16.
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chance of getting entrapped in a process over which China has
less control or in which its bargaining power is diluted by an
increased number of players.
4) If the opportunities to pursue material gains unilaterally are
closed off, and China has little choice but to join multilateral
negotiations, then it should try to build coalitions to weaken
commitments. The reason is that although fear of opprobrium
may make it pay to cooperate, the total payoff may still be
higher if China does not have to make any costly multilateral
commitments at all. Thus China should try to create an
alternative coalition of [S]tates which provides it with sufficient
back[-]patting benefits to counteract the opprobrium from the
avoidance of substantive commitments.
5) If unilateral opportunities to maximize relative capabilities
are closed off, and coalition building unsuccessful, then China
should choose the least constraining options; try to prevent the
toughening of any commitments that cannot be avoided (e.g.,
try to dilute compliance requirements).71
Determined asset accumulation is believed to extend beyond the
material (i.e., economic and military) realm. Reputation, both abroad and at
home, an intangible resource but a highly valuable one, is also thought to be
a factor in the strategic decision calculus. International rules may thus be
respected because Chinese policy makers may be eager to bolster the
country’s image, and astutely leverage it in a subsequent search for further
tangible assets, or shore up their own domestic position by expediently
conforming to external standards and engaging in visible forms of
international cooperation.72
Such ruthless amassing of resources, both tangible and intangible, for
State or individual benefit features prominently in realist and (neoclassical)
utilitarian accounts of actor behavior in the global arena. Game theorists
complicate this elegant analytical picture by introducing a distinction
between collaboration and coordination games. The former has mixed
implications for compliance with international law: while all participants
are better off if they all conform, shirking may serve the interests of
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individual players.73 It is posited that China is a consummate practitioner of
collaboration strategies.
By contrast, coordination games reflect situations in which actors
benefit from the existence of a collective rule. The classic example is the
requirement to drive on the right (or left) side of the road, but not both.
Once such a rule is established, the incentive to shirk markedly diminishes,
or even vanishes altogether. In such circumstances, compliance may be
regarded as an equilibrium outcome.74 Recent academic work suggests that
the Chinese foreign policy apparatus is not oblivious to the logic of this
argument and may have internalized it, at least selectively.75
Unlike in some mathematical formulations and contrived laboratory
settings, real-life games are typically, albeit not invariably, ongoing.
Wherever this is the case, participants are likely to develop a heightened
awareness of their interdependence and enter into collaborative
arrangements.76 This is the theme pervading the institutionalist literature on
international legal compliance. The State continues to be perceived as a
self-centered unitary player.
Nevertheless, members of the global
community cooperate, forge agreements, and often even construct or
maintain elaborate regimes, both formal and informal. For them, casespecific rule conformity may be a rewarding long-term strategy consistent
with the national (as well as individual ruler) interest.77
Researchers exploring China’s compliance with international law
seldom explicitly identify themselves with institutionalism or the new
institutionalism. Yet, it would not be inappropriate to place a sizeable group
in this category. The assumptions they embrace and the conclusions they
reach are not dissimilar to those seen in institutionalist writings.78 The
73
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notion of a regime, participation in such structures, and adherence to their
rules is also beginning to be earnestly examined.79 It would be premature to
suggest that this loosely-defined position is replacing realism and
(neoclassical) utilitarianism as the dominant paradigm in the systematic
study of Chinese rule conformity in the global arena, but there can be little
doubt that it is an influential perspective, whatever its precise impact.
Constructivism or cognitivism is another approach, with deep roots in
this particular context, which has been recycled in a specific fashion by
scholars dissecting China’s international legal compliance and is displaying
considerable staying power. It has anthropological underpinnings because
of the emphasis accorded to cultural mechanisms as drivers (causes) of State
actions (effects). Analysts who employ this conceptual vehicle contend that,
in addressing macro-level phenomena, researchers should “start with the
recognition that nations like individuals . . . develop visions, dreams and
prejudices about themselves and the world that shape their
intentions . . . [,which makes it necessary] to consider the mind-sets of
leaders and people.”80
A book, which has attracted much academic attention, aptly titled
Perceptions and Misperceptions in International Politics,81 has provided an
impetus to the application of this framework to a number of pivotal Chinese
foreign policy issues. A leading sinologist has thus invoked image
structures and perception gaps to shed light on the posture vis-à-vis the
United States.82 Others have resorted to such concepts to explain attitudes
toward and relations with Japan83 and the Soviet Union.84 These theoretical
efforts have complemented the strand of academic literature based on realist
and (neoclassical) utilitarian postulates.
Indeed, sinologists practiced constructivism or cognitivism long
before the term was formally incorporated into the international politics
lexicon. The psychological significance of perceived Chinese ascendancy as
79
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a Middle Kingdom (Zhongguo) was consistently emphasized and it was
noted that, symbolically, “it is a measure of a world in disequilibrium if
China does not have a place of respect commensurate with its size and
history.”85 The impact of this strategic configuration came sharply to the
surface when an empirically-oriented social scientist observed “the almost
universally expressed desire of Chinese to economically, culturally and
politically resume their ‘rightful place’ . . . in the region, and ultimately in
the world . . . a vision shared across generations, walks of life, and system
levels.”86
Despite its perceived pre-eminence as a Middle Kingdom, China had
also been subject to adverse cyclical patterns, characterized by dynastic falls
during which the Mandate of Heaven was periodically withdrawn, but
eventually followed by another reacceleration in momentum. The Century
of Humiliation (bainain guochi), in the aftermath of the defeat in the First
Opium War (1839-1842), which lasted until the end of the Second World
War, was the most painful such episode, arousing a sense of “humiliation,
impotence, and rage felt by China’s elites in the face of colonial
representation of their country and their people. This humiliation knew no
political boundaries,”87 deeply affecting the stance toward the outside world
and the conduct of foreign policy.88
The vulnerabilities that came to the fore during the Century of
Humiliation notwithstanding, China continued to be perceived as potentially
powerful, and hence threatening, by virtue of its large population, physical
size, and vast resources. Even as the country was laid prostrate and suffered
foreign subjugation in the wake of the Boxer Uprising (1898-1901),
“Westerners like Robert Hart were nevertheless warning from Beijing in
1900 that the future will have a ‘Yellow’ question—perhaps a ‘yellow
peril’—to deal with, [and that this prognosis] is as certain as the [assertion
that the] sun will shine tomorrow.”89 Again, that sentiment had profoundly
influenced cognitions on both sides, turning into the behavioral equivalent of
a self-fulfilling prophecy.90
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Realists and (neoclassical) utilitarians do not dismiss the significance
of cultural constructs. However, they grapple with the notion on their own
terms. The picture painted in their work is one of a strategic tradition
entirely consistent with the premises underlying the realpolitik paradigm.91
It is even argued that the psychological burden wrought by the Century of
Humiliation has opportunistically been exploited as a strategic weapon in a
quest for national advantage.92 For instance: “because of their perception of
the country as a victim of historical wrongs, China’s leaders have developed
what might be called a diplomatic culture of entitlement, as may be seen
from their expectation of favorable treatment from Japan by invoking wartime guilt or from the United States by demanding generosity as of right.”93
Such revisionist assessments have not prevented implicit, and at times
explicit, constructivism or cognitivism from remaining an integral part of the
repertoire of students of Chinese foreign policy. Indeed, in the field of
compliance with international law, some of the most detailed and
theoretically coherent exploration has been undertaken in a manner
sympathetic to this analytical perspective.94 That scholarly endeavor has
yielded conceptual insights dovetailing with transnational legal theory, a
school of thought that highlights the impact of State participation in global
processes (with special reference to those embedded in international law),
which may be viewed as forms of direct and indirect socialization (causes),
on attitudes (or images) that shape strategic responses (effects).95
The propagation of international norms is believed to materialize
through a number of channels and involve several socialization agents
emitting mutually-reinforcing impulses such as bureaucratic compliance
procedures, governmental norm sponsors, interpretive communities and lawdeclaring forums, issue linkages, transnational issue networks, and
transnational entrepreneurs.96 Of these, the first and the second are thought
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to already exert influence in China,97 an evaluation that perhaps understates
the importance of the role played by agents not formally associated with the
State (e.g., non-governmental organizations in the environmental domain).98
Persuasion theory, borrowed from social psychology, is invoked to
suggest that previously peripheral (or not closely integrated) actors like the
Chinese may be particularly amenable to international socialization because
of their entry into relatively unfamiliar segments of the global arena and
generally fresh mind (i.e., the presence of few cognitive priors or prior
beliefs).99 That said, it does not necessarily follow that the learning process
invariably culminates in the full and unqualified internalization of
international norms.100 In fact, instrumental adoption, motivated by tactical
considerations, may take place.101
This approach is viewed by its proponents not just as another
component of a multi-pronged strategy to gain better understanding of
China’s international legal behavior but as the most appropriate analytical
tool for addressing the task. It is said to be conceptually superior to the
perspectives examined earlier (realism, utilitarianism, and new
institutionalism) and others that have been accorded less attention by
researchers in this domain (e.g., rule-legitimacy theory, internationalism, or
rule-identity theory and managerialism).102 Whether or not the claim is
justified, it attests to the inherent intellectual attractions of sociological-type
explanations which venture beyond the narrow confines of economic-like
logic while remaining on firm empirical ground.
III.

TARGETING AREAS THAT MERIT ATTENTION

A.

Pinpointing Missing Empirical Components

The literature surveyed in the preceding section goes a considerable
way toward providing a solid foundation for obtaining insight into Chinese
international legal compliance and systematically exploring the subject.103 A
substantial amount of information has been generated, predominantly
qualitative in nature, but some of it in quantitative form. A large number of
case studies have been conducted over a long period of time and in different
97
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100
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circumstances.104 Most have been of the stand-alone variety, yet there have
been notable exceptions to the rule. Virtually every relevant sphere of
China’s international activity has come under scrutiny.
Scholarly examination has often been inspired by descriptive
concerns, or a desire to merely establish whether compliance occurs.
However, the focus has increasingly shifted toward scientific-style analytical
probing. Key terms have carefully been defined, conceptual relationships
have been dissected, and the issue of empirical manifestation (i.e.,
indicators) has been at least tentatively considered. The explanations offered
have at times been expressed in a fashion suited for problem-centered policy
discourse, rather than academic learning, but the theoretical dimension has
become more salient.
Nevertheless, there is room for broadening the scope of inquiry and
placing it on a firmer analytical footing. One aspect of the research process
that leaves something to be desired is the rather inadequate methodological
basis underpinning it. As pointed out above, the question of conceptindicator connection has not been completely overlooked. Be that as it may,
the issue has not been dealt with comprehensively and effectively. As
matters stand, it continues for the most part to be consigned to the
investigative periphery and is touched upon in passing, without a genuine
effort to construct empirical measures and apply them.
One notable exception to the norm has been the attempt to gauge
China’s exercise of global responsibility and adherence to international law
by resorting to data-derived proxies, even if rather crude in nature. Indicators
such as membership in international organizations, number of headquarters
and secretariats of such entities in the country, and volume of treaties
acceded to have been employed in order to determine the level of and
changes in overall rule conformity.105 Such measures are very rough indeed
(e.g., are all treaties equally important?), but in the absence of quantitative
indicators or equivalent one, are entirely dependent on subjective judgment
of those performing the assessment.
This is a domain where scholarship focused on the Chinese situation
has simply not kept pace with developments elsewhere. Compliance with
human rights obligations of States is a case on point. This has been a
primary area of concern with respect to China. It is an analytically, as well
as politically, challenging subject to come to grips with. However, precisely
for that reason, it is one where close attention has long been paid to the need
for reliable empirical measures and where the efforts made on this front have
104
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borne some fruit, although the process may have not yet reached a mature
stage.106
Some of the indicators in question focus on developmental progress
rather than adherence to human rights requirements per se. Such empirical
measures generate useful information for policy and related purposes, but
they do not hold entities whose behavior is monitored accountable to
international legal standards (i.e., they merely “examine the state of the
situation and not the right to that situation”).107 By the same token, they
seldom succeed in taking “discrimination into account and provide only a
partial picture of the human rights situation in a [S]tate.”108
Nevertheless, development indicators are not irrelevant in this context.
Importantly, such empirical measures may overlap with their human rights
counterparts (e.g., funds devoted to protecting human rights).109 Moreover,
it is possible to disaggregate development indicators to a point whereby they
reflect differential access to resources by distinct groups or the treatment of
specific segments of the population. If performed in a satisfactory fashion,
the exercise may yield information that pertains to social discrimination and
may thus support evaluation of a human rights regime.110
Development indicators are produced on a large scale by various arms
of the Chinese government and other parties. Empirical measures centering
on human rights directly are more difficult to obtain, but are neither so
scarce nor so complicated to generate independently that omitting them
altogether may legitimately be considered as a practical necessity. There are
human rights indicators that emphasize State violations and those that gauge
the extent to which rights-holders enjoy their rights; event-based indicators;
measures derived from socio-economic data; indicators capturing household
perceptions; measures reflecting expert judgments; civil and political rights
indicators; measures of economic, social, and cultural rights; structural
indicators; process measures; outcome indicators; and benchmarks.111
Students of China’s compliance with international law have made very
limited headway in confronting this facet of the research enterprise.
Empirical measures, even when they do not involve elaborate
quantitative manipulation, are not an integral part of the craft of legal
106
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scholarship. Case studies, a time-tested qualitative method, are normally
preferred and can be said to have served the profession more than
adequately. However, unless employed carefully and in a structured
manner, this technique may be characterized by a high degree of
fuzziness.112 Unless applicable standards of scientific inquiry are observed,
questions of reliability and validity may be raised, irrespective of how
conscientious the endeavor and how meticulous the dissection of the
material.113
The problem must to be confronted in descriptive case studies,
especially if they entail the construction of typologies, whether deductive or
inductive,114 but it may prove particularly challenging in explanatory
research. In such work, where theories are either built or tested,115 the
attribution of causality looms large in the undertaking and this may
necessitate the imposition of more stringent criteria for demonstrating the
robustness of findings.116 Conceptual linkages need to be delineated with a
measure of precision and in methodologically appropriate terms (i.e.,
direction, linearity, polarity, strength, symmetry, temporality, and so
forth).117 The connection between theoretical generalizations and supporting
evidence should be made as tight as realistically possible.118
These issues are easier to address if prospective design (whereby
changes are tracked forward over time)119 is relied upon than when
retrospective format (whereby data are collected after the fact)120 is resorted
to, which is typically the pattern in legal studies, but they cannot be
overlooked in any circumstances. However demanding such requirements
are, the difficulties they pose can be at least partly circumvented by
following the steps involved in the process of analytic induction.121 Tools
112
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such as pattern matching, developed specially to enhance the effectiveness
of qualitative inquiry,122 and employed successfully by sinologists in the
international relations field,123 may further bolster the conceptual potential of
case studies.124
B.

Identifying Missing Explanatory Ingredients

China’s compliance with international law is a subject of great
academic and practical interest, which is attracting growing scholarly
attention. Theoretical sophistication is not lacking, but the methodological
foundations cannot be portrayed as sturdy. Retrospective case studies are
conducted liberally with few, if any, of the relevant scientific standards
adhered to. Embracing the findings generated unambiguously may be a
risky proposition as there is no sufficient transparency and there is a distinct
possibility that the same material, if dissected by another researcher, might
be subject to a completely different interpretation, which is scarcely a trivial
matter.
The problems to which this gives rise vary from one school of thought
to another. The realist and (neoclassical) utilitarian fields are so crowded
that one could argue that the conclusions offered by such a large number of
scholars have a degree of consensual validity.125 The same argument may be
extended, albeit less emphatically, to the institutionalist camp. For those
who subscribe to transnational legal process theory, the challenge is more
formidable because the size of the group is rather modest. Here, the entire
cases that might disprove the proposition) and revise the proposition until you achieve a causal proposition
that accounts for all cases. See NORMAN K. DENZIN, THE RESEARCH ACT: A THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION
TO SOCIOLOGICAL METHODS 192 (Aldine Publishing 1970).
122
See DE VAUS, supra note 113, at 253-60.
123
See HE, supra note 75, at 161-64.
124
Literal and theoretical replication may serve a similar purpose. It consists of two interrelated
questions and corresponding steps: Does the full set of outcome characteristics occur if the causal factor is
present? If so we have confirmation of our theory . . . We would then find another case where the
presumed causal factor is present and see whether the full set of outcomes is also present in that case. If so
we have a literal replication of the previous case and further confirmation of our theory . . . Do we get cases
where the presumed causal factor is present but only some of the predicted outcome characteristics are
present? If we find such cases then we have failed to replicate the theory and we would either reject or
modify the theory. If we could find no cases where the cause was present and the full set of outcomes was
not present then we have a theoretical replication . . . We would then seek to find a case in which the
presumed causal factor is not present. That is, we should not find cases where we have the effects without
our presumed cause. If we fail to find any such cases we have achieved further theoretical replication. See
DE VAUS, supra note 113, at 262-63.
125
An indicator, or observation, possesses consensual validity when numerous persons in different
situations accept it as a good measure of a concept or description of the underlying phenomenon. See
KENNETH J. MEIER, JEFFREY L. BRUDNEY & JOHN BOHTE, APPLIED STATISTICS FOR PUBLIC AND
NONPROFIT ADMINISTRATION 17 (Thomson Wadworth 7th ed. 2009).
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analytical edifice rests on one comprehensive survey126 and a handful of
narrower investigations.127
The picture painted cannot be unequivocally read in the way
suggested by the authors because of the looseness of the conceptual
framework. Is rule conformity indeed the product of international
participation or socialization, or is it the result of some other variable? If the
latter is the case, what is regarded here as the driving force may in fact be
the outcome of different influences. Even if international participation or
socialization is part of the causal chain, it may be merely one element and
not necessarily the most crucial. And, if several variables are at work, what
is the structure of the complex model?128
Nor should increasing theoretical sophistication be mistaken for
comprehensiveness. The most glaring gap is the virtual absence of the
domestic scene from explorations of Chinese conformity to international
rules. The intricate home front is treated as a metaphorical black box. The
sole notable exception to the norm is the previously mentioned attempt to
predict compliance with the provisions of the Sino-British Joint Declaration.
While it suffered from other flaws,129 the authors nevertheless put forward a
model firmly rooted in group theory and went to considerable analytical and
empirical lengths in their effort to determine how various domestic interests
might impinge on policies vis-à-vis Hong Kong.130
This is a puzzling configuration as the unitary actor assumption, while
conceptually convenient for explanatory purposes, is at variance with the
substantial body of writings on decision making in China. In the early days
of communist rule, there may have been a tendency to highlight the cohesion
of the ruling elite (e.g., Mao-in-command formulation), but this perspective
quickly gave way to approaches emphasizing factional disputes, ideological
strains, institutional fragmentation, intra-elite conflict, power struggles, and
so forth.131 Rendering such forces theoretically subservient to more
concentrated (as distinct from diffuse) influences (e.g., international
participation or socialization), whether abroad or at home, simply flies in the
face of widely available evidence on Chinese strategy making and
implementation.
126

See KENT, BEYOND COMPLIANCE, supra note 16.
See Carlson, supra note 16; Yu, supra note 16.
128
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See Mushkat & Mushkat, The Political Economy of International Legal Compliance, supra note
16; Mushkat & Mushkat, International Law and Game Theory, supra note 16.
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Interestingly, domestic interests feature prominently in a strand of the
rationalist literature on compliance with international law (to which realism
and utilitarianism belong) which dispenses with the unitary actor framework.
It is known as institutional liberalism, or alternatively liberal
institutionalism, and its proponents disaggregate the State and bring into
focus internal political processes. They contend that the home environment
is “much more complex than realists and institutionalists acknowledge.
States are not unitary, but rather are the sum of many different parts.
Understanding those parts—the political institutions, interest groups, and
[S]tate actors—is essential to fully understanding [S]tate action on the world
stage.”132
The domestic-international nexus has not been merely identified as
worthy of attention but has been examined in an analytically rigorous
fashion.133 Scholars in the field of international relations whose expertise
lies in China’s external relations have not been oblivious to these
developments. Some have approached the subject broadly,134 but others
have addressed specific hypotheses found in conceptually advanced writings
on rule conformity in the global arena.135 However, thus far, theoreticians
concerned with Chinese international legal compliance have not moved
decisively to close the gap.
Another persistent and problematic characteristic of their work has
been the single-factor structure of the explanations provided. Sometimes it
is desirable to unambiguously lean in one direction or another and enhance
clarity by constructing a model around its crucial attributes. In certain
circumstances, this may also constitute the most effective way of capturing
the essence of real phenomena, however intricate. Nevertheless, the narrow
path continually trodden by international law researchers on that front again
flies in the face of evidence suggesting that a broader, multi-pronged
strategy may be called for.
It is interesting to contrast this pattern with the diverse route followed
by economists and political scientists in exploring closely related topics such
as China’s internationalization and multilateral diplomacy. In the case of the
former process, multiple explanations have been offered stressing the role of
factors such as the prevalence of regulatory controls and the impact of their
132
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lowering in a setting with a favorable (in the sense of being conducive to
integration) incentive structure, pressures emanating from comparative
advantage, influence of international market forces on domestic interests,
institutional rigidity (and flexibility), development-oriented East Asian
bureaucratic mindset, corporatist form of social organization (predisposing
policy makers toward pro-business initiatives), administrative
decentralization (unleashing powerful forces at the local level), the
irresistible pull of network capitalism (driven by overseas Chinese), foreign
maneuvering, and benefits captured by functionaries (and agents in general)
reacting to these developments or spearheading them.136
Some of these accounts are not inconsistent with those furnished by
legal scholars, particularly ones with realist, utilitarian, and institutionalist
inclinations. Moreover, they may be regarded as competing to a certain
extent. At the same time, where appropriate, complementarity is not
overlooked and, the diversity notwithstanding, attempts are being made to
combine the separate threads into a coherent whole.137 The quest for
synthesis is not pursued merely at the conceptual level but also in the
empirical domain. The entire loosely-connected and intricate theoretical
edifice has been tested and refined in a series of case studies.138
The dynamics of multilateral diplomacy is perhaps even more
illuminating in this context because the process involves specific
discretionary decisions supposedly taken at the top level of the
organizational pyramid following an elaborate process of strategic
deliberation (in a manner similar to acts of conformity to international law),
although it would be inappropriate to liken it to a sophisticated game of
chess, given that the usual behavioral qualifications apply. One might be
tempted here to embrace one explanation or another (self-interest,
cooperative spirit, altruism, culturally-induced sense of community,
international socialization, and so forth), but this temptation has generally
been resisted.
It should be noted at the outset that the shift toward multilateralism
constitutes a radical, albeit not abrupt, departure for a country that “has for a
long time clung to bilateralism or unilateralism in its handling of regional
disputes and managing its foreign relations.”139 However one accounts for
136
See generally DAVID ZWEIG, INTERNATIONALIZING CHINA: DOMESTIC AND GLOBAL LINKAGES 718 (Cornell Univ. Press 2002); David Zweig & Zhimin Chen, Introduction: International Political
Economy and Explanations of China’s Globalization, in CHINA’S REFORMS AND INTERNATIONAL
POLITICAL ECONOMY (David Zweig & Zhimin Chen eds., Routledge 2007).
137
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it, this strategic turnaround “is phenomenal enough to call attention to it.”140
Importantly, the fundamental adjustment that has taken place
“brings . . . China . . . much closer to the evolving Western mentality in the
way of viewing world affairs, as, concurrently multilateralism rises as a
principle in the guidance of governmental foreign-policy making in major
advanced industrialized countries.”141
It should also be observed that the Chinese variant of multilateralism
is selective in nature. The rhetoric (word) may be devoid of ambiguities, but
the practice (deed) does not display a similar strength of commitment to the
principle. Rather, there are policy domains “in which China does not want
to be bound by multilateral diplomacy, and where it likes to continue to
employ a bilateralist and even a unilateralist approach.”142 By the same
token, the strategy is as much driven by a desire to promote a multipolar
world order (i.e., erode American hegemonic dominance) as by a normative
preference for interdependence in the positive sense of the term.143
As to the underlying motives, there is a bias in favor of realist,
utilitarian, and institutionalist explanations. Multilateralism is supposed to
be conducive to economic development, it provides a convenient antidote to
hegemonic power (i.e., it promotes multipolarism), it enhances the country’s
image (reputation, an important consideration in rationalist writings), and it
furnishes an effective platform for managing security issues, particularly on
a regional basis.144 However, there is also recognition that a complex
interplay between domestic and international forces is at work (as posited by
liberal institutionalists)145 and that the strategy is not without normative
underpinnings, whatever their origins.146
Analytical diversity, coupled with structural integration, is a salient
feature of the study of Chinese international relations in general rather than
merely in a limited number of policy realms. The views expounded do not
always stretch across the whole conceptual range and cannot readily be
140
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harmonized in all circumstances. It is not altogether uncommon for
researchers to adopt a well-defined perspective (such as the realist
standpoint) and apply it consistently without deviating from the chosen
path,147 although this practice is rapidly becoming a thing of the past.
However, there is awareness of competing or complementary approaches,
absolute claims are eschewed, theoretical propositions are placed in a broad
context, and sooner or later someone performs a balancing act by
systematically accommodating the divergent or convergent insights within
an overarching framework.
Such a framework typically encompasses, in an organized manner, a
host of domestic and external factors that impinge on foreign policy
outcomes. Domestic-external linkages are also accorded ample attention.
The individual components of the entire architecture are carefully
assembled, evaluated, fine-tuned, and consolidated.148 The product is a more
complex but less fractured mosaic than encountered in the international law
literature and, in terms of its explanatory effectiveness and heuristic value, a
credible model toward which scholars concerned with China’s rule
conformity in the global arena should possibly aspire.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Chinese civilization has deep and rich historical roots, but it has
evolved in a cyclical fashion and has experienced a high degree of
turbulence. The peaks of exuberance and valleys of despondency traversed
have had several noteworthy characteristics, including an orientation toward
the outside world that may be portrayed as outward- or inward-looking.
Since the curtain has descended on the 1949-1978 revolutionary era, China
has recognized the merits of interdependence and has practiced
multilateralism, albeit in its own peculiar way, or not unreservedly.
The shift toward greater openness has apparently been accompanied
by an increasing willingness to play by international rules. An erstwhile
rogue State seems to have been transformed into a status-quo power without
exhibiting pronounced revisionist tendencies. Researchers in the field of
international law have been exploring to what extent this metamorphosis has
taken place, in what circumstances, and for what reasons. They have made
considerable progress in that respect, but the picture remains hazy. This is
partly due to the intellectual challenge that the subject poses and the
147
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relatively modest resources channeled toward its examination. The
comparison with international relations is not flattering, yet it is not
completely valid because this has been a less intensive effort undertaken by
a smaller group of scholars operating independently.
However, it is legitimate to argue that there is room, even in the face
of significant constraints, to place the whole enterprise on a firmer
conceptual footing. Lingering empirical issues must be grappled with and
the quest for explanations needs to be pursued more rigorously. As matters
stand, the methodological and theoretical foundations are not solid enough to
support unambiguous generalizations. This is an unfortunate configuration
given the importance of the question motivating scholarly endeavor in the
sphere delineated in the present paper. It is not inappropriate to contend that
Chinese international legal compliance should be monitored as precisely as
possible and understood better than is currently the case.
Methodological and theoretical stocktaking, such as undertaken here,
is by definition a backward-looking exercise. The existing literature is
placed under the proverbial microscope, its limitations are brought into
focus, and the merits of alternative, hopefully more fruitful, research
strategies are highlighted. The forward-looking part of the project
necessitates moving beyond retrospective base-building and applying the
proposed analytical tools across the entire space involving China’s encounter
with international law and in specific areas. That is a task not just for the
author of this article but also other scholars engaged, individually or
collectively, in dissecting Chinese international legal behavior.

